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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the extent to which the European Union (EU) has 
achieved harmonisation in terms of audit exemption for small companies. Using the case of 
the UK, it analyses the sufficiency of turnover as a surrogate for the motivation of the 
directors of small, private companies to have a voluntary audit of their annual financial 
statements. The data is drawn from a survey of the directors of small companies (Collis, 
2003), which was conducted at a time when the UK government was consulting on a proposal 
to raise the size thresholds for a small company to the EU maxima. 
 
An analysis of secondary data reveals that 92% of the EU-25 offer audit exemption to small 
companies and the UK is one of three countries now using the maximum EU size thresholds. 
Focusing on the UK experience, 42% of directors of small companies want to continue 
having an audit. It was found that turnover is not sufficient alone as a surrogate for either 
management or agency factors and makes an independent contribution to the explanation of 
the demand for audit. Management factors relate to the view that audit provides a check on 
accounting records and systems and improves the quality of the financial information. 
Agency factors relate to providing assurance to shareholders if the company is not wholly 
family owned or has external shareholders, providing assurance to the bank and other lenders, 
and the view that audit has a positive effect on the company’s credit rating score. 
 
In the UK, raising the thresholds to meet EU harmonisation objectives has meant that the 
enlarged category of small companies contains two subgroups with differing needs. 
Deregulation means directors are free to choose and in a significant proportion of cases it 
would appear that the benefit of an audit outweighs the costs. This will be reassuring news to 
the accountancy profession, banks, lenders and other creditors who rely on the audited 
financial statements for assessing and monitoring risk. However, lenders and creditors have 
the economic power to ensure that their needs are met and this UK study shows it is 
important that regulators in other EU member states protect the needs of minority 
shareholders requiring the assurance of an independent audit.  
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper examines the extent to which the European Union (EU) has achieved 
harmonisation in terms of audit exemption for small companies. Using the case of the UK, it 
analyses the sufficiency of turnover as a surrogate for the motivation of the directors of small, 
private companies to voluntarily demand audit assurance (Abdel-Khalik, 1989). The data is 
drawn from a survey of the directors of small companies (Collis, 2003), which was conducted 
at a time when the UK government was consulting on a proposal to raise the size thresholds 
for a small company to the EU maxima.
1
 
 
For many years in the UK all active limited companies, irrespective of size, were required to 
have an independent audit. This external examination of and expression of opinion on the 
annual accounts demonstrates ‘the completeness, accuracy and validity of transactions which, 
when aggregated, make up the financial statements’ (Power, 1997, p. 24). However, audit 
regulation ‘emphasised the difficulties of attempting to enforce one set of rules on a widely 
diverse market, from ICI to the sweet shop’ (Fearnley and Page, 1994). In 1994 this state of 
universality was changed when provisions permitted under EU law to exempt small 
companies from the statutory audit were first adopted in the UK. 
 
Initially, the size thresholds in UK law were set below the maxima given in the EU Company 
Law Directive (78/660/EEC), but over the next decade they were revised upwards several 
times, until in 2004 they matched the EU maxima. Throughout this period, there was 
considerable controversy over the appropriateness of the thresholds and impact it would have 
on the accountancy profession and the users of the accounts. Until recently, the debate in the 
UK was dominated by anecdotal evidence from the regulators and the profession, and the 
views of the users were largely ignored. Previous research shows the main users are the 
owner-directors (Page, 1984; Carsberg, Page, Sindall and Waring, 1985; Barker and Noonan, 
1996), who use the statutory accounts for a range of internal and external purposes (Collis 
and Jarvis, 2000 and 2002). Their views are vital as they must weigh up the costs and benefits 
of having an independent audit. 
  
The paper is organised as follows. The next section provides an overview of progress towards 
harmonisation in audit exemption for small companies in the 25 member states that currently 
make up the EU. In addition, it examines the case of the UK as an example of one of three 
countries that have now adopted the EU maxima for defining a small company for the 
purpose of audit exemption. This is followed by a review of evidence from the UK literature 
on the most appropriate level for defining a small company and the costs and benefits to the 
directors of having the accounts audited. From this review, hypotheses are developed and the 
next section goes on to describe the methodology for the study. The penultimate section 
presents the results of the analysis and the paper concludes with a discussion of the results 
and their implications. 
 
                                                 
1
 This supports the government’s stance on evidence-based policymaking (Cabinet Office, 1999). 
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2. Introduction of audit exemption and progress towards harmonisation 
 
2.1 Role of small firms in the economy 
 
The introduction of audit exemption for small companies and other EU regulatory relaxations 
in financial reporting has its roots in the growing importance of smaller enterprises. Small 
businesses are ‘the backbone of the European economy, acknowledged as a constant source 
of ideas, innovation and entrepreneurial skills, the principal providers of existing jobs and the 
main source of new employment’ (European Commission, 2006a, p. 1). 
 
Since the recessions of the 1980s there has been a considerable expansion in the number of 
micro businesses (1 to 9 employees), small businesses (10 to 49 employees) and medium-
sized businesses (50 to 249 employees. In the UK, for example there were only 2.4m 
businesses at the start of 1980 but by 2005 this had increased by nearly 80% to 4.3m at the 
start of 2005. Most of this growth is accounted for by increased numbers of micro-businesses 
and one-person companies (SBS, 2002). Indeed, micro, small and medium-sized enterprises 
(collectively known as SMEs) now account for 99.9% of the 4.3m enterprises in the UK and 
contribute 59% of employment and 51% of turnover (SBS, 2006). In the EU, 99% of the 23m 
enterprises are SMEs and provide 75m jobs (European Commission, 2005). 
 
As in many other EU countries, the majority of SMEs in the UK are unincorporated 
businesses operating as sole proprietorships or general partnerships. Nevertheless, at the start 
of 2005, 24% of small enterprises were small companies (0-49 employees) and 95% of the 
1,084,700 limited companies on the register were small companies (SBS, 2006). 
 
2.2 Influence of the EU 4
th
 Company Law Directive 
 
Under Article 51 of the 4
th
 Company Law Directive (78/660/EEC), all limited companies are 
required to have their annual accounts audited, but Article 11 gives member states an option 
to exempt small companies. Table 1 shows small companies as a proportion of the total 
number of limited companies in each member state for 2003
2
 and, hence, those likely to be 
exempt. At the time the data was compiled, the EU had 19 members, including 4 accession 
countries. However, by 1 May 2004, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland and Slovakia 
had completed the process of accession, bringing the total accession countries to 10 and the 
number of member states to 25
3
 (Day and Taylor, 2005). 
                                                 
2
 2003 is the latest year for which figures are available. A note in the original publication explains the statistics 
are only indicative because the database contained a limited part of the population of companies. 
3
 The EU-25 comprises the original members of the European Economic Community created by the Treaty of 
Rome in 1957: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. They were joined by the 
Denmark, Ireland and the UK in 1973; Greece in 1981; Portugal and Spain in 1986; Austria, Finland and 
Sweden in 1995; Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland and Slovakia. 
Romania and Bulgaria are due to join in 2007.  
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Table 1 
Small companies as a percentage of total companies in EU-19 
 
Country % small in 2003 
Austria 90 
Belgium 95 
Czech Republic* 83 
Denmark 93 
Estonia* 97 
Finland 94 
France 94 
Germany 89 
Greece 85 
Hungary* 67 
Ireland 94 
Italy 85 
Luxembourg 77 
Netherlands 89 
Portugal 85 
Slovenia* 78 
Spain 95 
Sweden 95 
UK  95 
Total 94 
 
* Accession countries 
Adapted from European Commission, 2006b, p. 7. 
 
According to the 4
th
 Company Law Directive, a small company is one that for two 
consecutive years does not exceed any two of the three size thresholds shown in Table 2. 
These thresholds are subject to periodic revision by the European Commission for indexation 
purposes, and by way of example the table shows the maxima in 1999, 2003 and those that 
have been agreed for 2008. 
 
Table 2 
Size criteria for EU audit exemption 
 
 Maxima in 
 1999 
Maxima since 
 2003 
Maxima from 
2008 
Turnover €5.0m €7.30m €8.8m 
Balance sheet total €2.5m €3.65m €4.4m 
Average number of employees 50 50 50 
 
Adapted from DTI, 1999a (Annex B) and European Commission, 2006b (p. 6). 
 
2.3 Turnover thresholds in EU-25 
 
It is useful to consider the extent to which national jurisdictions in the 25 member states that 
comprise the EU have adopted audit exemption. However, the degree of variation must be 
interpreted within the context of country-specific social, economic and cultural differences; 
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the different notions held by national regulators about the objective of financial reporting; 
and the relative importance of principles and rules (Haller and Walton, 1998). In addition, it 
must be borne in mind that 10 of the 25 member states are accession countries and have only 
recently been admitted to the EU. Moreover, eight of these are transition economies and two 
are emerging market economies (Day and Taylor, 2005), which further complicates inter-
country comparison. Therefore, care must be taken when drawing conclusions from Table 3, 
which gives an indication of turnover thresholds in the 25 member states in early 2006 by 
grouping them into bands.
4
 
 
Table 3 
Turnover thresholds in EU-25 
 
Turnover category Country (ordered by size of turnover threshold) 
No exemption Denmark,
5
 Sweden, Malta 
Up to  €1m Hungary, Latvia, Estonia, Finland, Slovakia 
€1.1m - €2m Ireland 
€2.1m - €3m Czech Republic, Lithuania, Greece, Portugal 
€3.1m - €4m France 
€4.1m - €5m Slovenia, Spain, Poland 
€5.1m - €6m None 
€6.1m - €7m Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria, Italy 
€7.1m - €7.3m Cyprus, Netherlands, Germany, UK 
 
Adapted from European Commission, 2006b, p. 7. 
 
Among the accession countries, Slovenia, Poland and Cyprus have adopted relatively high 
thresholds. The turnover and the balance sheet total thresholds in Cyprus are very close to the 
EU ceilings, but only Netherlands, Germany and the UK have the adopted the EU maxima. 
Therefore, in the 12 years since the 4
th
 Company Law Directive was introduced in 1994, 
Europe has achieved 12% harmonization in terms of adoption of the maximum thresholds. 
Since national jurisdiction can set lower thresholds than the maxima, an alternative measure 
is to say that 92% of member states currently offer audit exemption to small companies using 
country-specific size criteria or the EU maxima. 
 
2.4 The case of the UK 
 
In order to examine the development of deregulation in this particular aspect of financial 
reporting by small companies in more detail, the case of the UK is now considered. The 
development of company law in the UK is the responsibility of the Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI). It is shaped by national policies and influenced by EU Directives (Fearnley 
and Hines, 2003). 
 
Audit exemption was first introduced in 1994 through an amendment to section 249A of the 
Companies Act 1985 (SI 1994/1935), which allowed a company with a turnover up to 
                                                 
4
 This table is based on a bar chart, which cannot be reproduced without the underlying data. However, the 
source is believed to be based on a report by Ramboll Management for the European Commission in December 
2005, which appears to have flaws due to currency conversion or other problems. 
5
 In March 2006 Denmark introduced exemption if a company fulfilled two of the following three conditions: 
turnover under €400,000, balance sheet total under €200,000 and fewer than 12 employees. 
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£90,000 (lower than the EU maximum threshold at that time) and a balance sheet total up to 
£1.4m and up to 50 employees to forgo the statutory audit, unless a full audit was required by 
shareholders who held at least 10% of share capital. Companies with a turnover of between 
£90,000 and £350,000 were given the option of filing a simpler audit exemption report 
(AER), but this lesser form of assurance was dropped in 1997, leaving companies with a 
turnover of £350,000 or less exempt from the statutory audit (SI 1997/936). However, a 
further condition imposed at that time required that the company also qualified as ‘small’ for 
the purpose of filing abbreviated accounts.
6
 
 
Under (sections 247 and 247A of the Companies Act 1985), apart from certain entities that 
are excluded for reasons of public interest, a company qualifies as ‘small’ if it meets any two 
of three basic size tests based on turnover, balance sheet total and average number of 
employees.
7
  Apart from a newly incorporated entity, the conditions must have been satisfied 
in two of the last three years (similar conditions apply to small groups). In 2000 the turnover 
threshold was increased to £1m (SI 2000/1430) with proposals to raise levels for all financial 
reporting purposes to the substantially higher EU maxima (DTI, 2000). In May 2003 the EU 
thresholds were adjusted for indexation purposes to turnover £5.6m and balance sheet total 
£2.8m and these thresholds were adopted in UK law with effect from January 2004 (SI 
2004/16). This process of step change in the turnover threshold in the UK to the EU maxima 
is summarised in Chart 1. 
 
Chart 1 
Changes in the turnover threshold for audit exemption in the UK 1994 – 2004 
 
Annual turnover
£90,000
£350,000
£1,000,000
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£1,000,000
£2,000,000
£3,000,000
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6
 The options set out in Section 246 of the Companies Act (as revised by SI 1997/220) allow small and medium-
sized companies to prepare and file either full or abbreviated financial statements with the Registrar, but they 
must provide full financial statements for their shareholders. Abbreviated accounts must be accompanied by a 
special auditors’ report, unless the company is exempt from the requirement for an audit by virtue of sections 
249A(1) or (2) or 250 of the Companies Act 1985.  
7
 Most of the requirements of the Companies Act 1985 also apply to limited liability partnerships, a new form of 
business vehicle permitted in the UK since April 2001. 
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3. Review of the literature 
 
3.1 Scope of the review 
 
Since the regulatory framework for corporate financial reporting is currently country-specific, 
inter-country comparison is problematic. A second problem relates to the number of changes 
to the size criteria for defining a small company in the UK, which means that the results of 
older studies have little relevance to today’s tranche of small companies. A further problem is 
that several past studies have been based on too small a sample to permit generalisation (for 
example, Page, 1984; Freedman and Goodwin, 1993; Pratten, 1998; Lin-Seouw, 2001). 
Therefore, this review considers the UK literature on the debate over the most appropriate 
level for defining a small company for the purpose of audit exemption and identifies previous 
studies that have reported on the opinions of the accountancy profession and the main users 
of the accounts: the owner-directors. This leads to the development of hypotheses relating to 
the motivation of the directors of small companies to demand a voluntary audit. 
 
3.2 Size factors 
 
The rationale for audit exemption in the UK has been is that it relieves the unnecessary cost 
burdens that fall disproportionately on small companies (DTI, 1995; DTI, 1999b). Implicit in 
this argument is the notion that below a certain size, the costs outweigh the benefits and vice 
versa. In 1999 the Trade Secretary, claimed that the average company would save £5,000 as a 
result of discontinuing the audit, but the profession responded that a more realistic figure was 
between £1,200 and £1,500 (Güntert, 2000). 
 
The accountancy profession’s views on the most appropriate level for audit exemption varied. 
A survey by the Small Practitioners Association in 1999 found that 92% of accountants 
‘supported exemption for all private, owner-managed, small limited companies’ (Mitchell, 
1999, p. 21). In 2003 the ICAEW described the proposal to raise thresholds to the EU 
maxima as ‘a positive step to ease the burdens on business’ (Accountancy, 2003, p. 9), but 
others in the ICAEW argued that would reduce the quality of the information put on public 
record (Jones, 2003). The ACCA was against lifting the limits, arguing that it would ‘take 
away the value-added aspect which comes with the audit’ (Beckerlegge, 1999, p. 21) and 
raise the risk of fraud (Rose, 2003). 
 
The precise number of companies taking up exemption in the early years has not been 
published, but Güntert (2000, p. 75) reported that at least 40% of those eligible when the 
turnover threshold was £350,000 were having a voluntary audit (implying a 60% take-up 
rate). However, he comments that ‘it is not clear whether thee companies were deliberately 
choosing to continue with an audit or simply didn’t realise that it wasn’t needed!’  
 
A MORI survey of 176 companies (ACCA, 1998) forecast that approximately 40% of 
companies with a turnover between £350,000 and £1.5m were likely to opt for audit 
exemption if the threshold were raised to a speculative level of £1.5m. In 2003 the 
government anticipated that raising thresholds to the EU maxima would add a further 69,000 
companies to the existing 822,000 companies classified as small (Eaglesham, 2003). 
Unfortunately, national statistics based on the proportion of small companies that might be 
eligible are not available. However, one year after thresholds were raised to the EU maxim it 
was estimated that 83% of non-dormant small companies had registered audit exempt 
Progress towards harmonisation of audit exemption in the EU and the case of the UK 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 7 
accounts (either full or abbreviated financial statements) and 17% were having a voluntary 
audit (POB, 2006, p. 33).   
 
In 1999, a survey of 385 companies filing full accounts with a turnover between £0.5m and 
£4.2m (the upper limit being the EU maximum at that time, which it was above the UK 
threshold of £350,000) found that in 29% of companies, the directors would forgo the audit if 
they had a choice, whilst 63% would have a voluntary audit (Collis and Jarvis, 2000). Based 
on this data, a subsequent study by Collis, Jarvis and Skerratt (2004), found that turnover 
alone was able to represent size to explain the demand for voluntary audit among the 
companies surveyed. This provides the basis for the size hypothesis tested in this paper: 
 
H1 Ceteris paribus, the likelihood of the directors choosing a voluntary audit 
increases with size, as measured by turnover. 
 
3.2 Management factors 
 
Writing as a member of the accountancy profession, Güntert (2000, pp. 75 and 76) claimed 
that the benefits of an audit include assurance for the directors in independent companies. 
‘The audit provides assurance by giving them increased confidence in the reported figures, 
the general financial position of the business, the financial basis for making decision, the 
reliability of the accounting system and the information it produces, and the early 
identification of trends that could lead to failure.’ In his view, an audit also increases the 
credibility of the accounts. 
 
A study by Collis et al. (2004) based on data collected by Collis and Jarvis (2000) identified 
several factors that influence the demand for voluntary audit in companies with a turnover 
between £0.5m and £4.2 m (the EU maxima at the time of the study). The results suggested 
that turnover was less important than qualitative factors associated with the directors’ views 
on the audit improving the quality of information and providing a check on internal records. 
Although the study had used a hypothetical construct for measuring the financial 
sophistication of the principal director, this variable was not significant. Nevertheless, 
intuition suggests that knowledge of the relative costs and benefits of an independent audit of 
the accounts is likely to influence the decision to take up exemption if the company is eligible 
to do so. 
 
This literature leads to the development of the following management hypotheses: 
  
H2 Ceteris paribus, the likelihood of the directors choosing a voluntary audit 
increases with perceptions that the audit provides a check on accounting 
records and systems. 
H3 Ceteris paribus, the likelihood of the directors choosing a voluntary audit 
increases with perceptions that the audit improves the quality of the 
financial information. 
H4 Ceteris paribus, the likelihood of the directors choosing a voluntary audit 
increases with perceptions that the audit improves the credibility of the 
financial information. 
H5 Ceteris paribus, the likelihood of the directors choosing a voluntary audit 
increases if they have a degree, a professional/vocational qualification or 
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have studied/trained in business or management subjects (surrogate for 
financial sophistication) 
 
3.3 Agency factors 
 
Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) suggests that where there is information 
asymmetry, the agent will be willing to bear the cost of supplying information to support the 
relationship with the principal. In a small company, a principal is anyone who is distant from 
the actions of management and is unable to verify those actions, such as external 
shareholders, lenders and creditors. Information asymmetry may also be present amongst 
internal shareholders if they lack the necessary skills to interpret financial information 
(Power, 1997). 
 
An independent audit of internal controls reduces inherent risk (the likelihood of a material 
misstatement arising) and control risk (the likelihood of the accounting control detecting any 
material misstatement), which may be high in small companies. Whilst an audit does not set 
out to detect fraud, it can play a key role in detecting material fraud and also acts as a 
deterrent to fraudsters (Güntert, 2000). 
 
Collis and Jarvis (2000) identified the main non-statutory recipients of the statutory accounts 
of small companies in the UK as being the bank/lenders, the tax authorities, managers and 
creditors. Recent evidence from the directors companies and accountants collated by the 
Professional Oversight Board (POB, 2006) confirms that these are the users to whom 
voluntary audit is considered useful. The study by Collis et al. (2004) demonstrates that the 
agency relationships that have a significant impact on the demand for voluntary audit at those 
with the bank/lenders and those with external owners. 
 
This literature underpins the following agency hypotheses: 
 
H6 Ceteris paribus, the likelihood of the directors choosing a voluntary audit 
increases if they are not wholly family owned. 
H7 Ceteris paribus, the likelihood of the directors choosing a voluntary audit 
increases if they have external shareholders without access to internal 
financial information. 
H8 Ceteris paribus, the likelihood of the directors choosing a voluntary audit 
increases if they give a copy of their statutory accounts to the bank and 
other providers of finance. 
H9 Ceteris paribus, the likelihood of the directors choosing a voluntary audit 
increases with perceptions that the audit has a positive effect on the 
company’s credit rating score. 
 
4. Methodology 
 
4.1 Purpose of the study 
 
The study by Collis et al. (2004) suffers from two limitations: first, the sampling frame was 
not fully representative of companies with a turnover of less than £0.5m at that time; second, 
the significant increase in the exemption level since 1999 when the underlying data was 
collected means the views of the directors of a wider tranche of companies must be sought. 
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This paper is based on data collected by Collis (2003) which addressed the above 
deficiencies. The purpose of the paper is to present the results of a logistic regression study 
based on a survey in 2003 commissioned by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)
8
 as 
part of a the consultation on proposals to raise the UK audit exemption thresholds to the EU 
maxima. The study addresses the following overarching research question: 
 
What is the sufficiency of turnover as a surrogate for the motivation of the 
directors to voluntarily demand audit assurance? 
 
The nine hypotheses developed in the previous section are tested using the following general 
logistic regression model: 
 
Voluntary audit decision = f (turnover, management factors, agency factors) 
 
4.2 Data collection 
 
The data was collected via a postal questionnaire survey of the directors of active, 
independent, unlisted, limited companies. The population consisted of 3,202 private limited 
companies on the FAME database
9
 that had filed full accounts
10
 for 2002 and met the 
following size criteria (the EU maxima at the beginning of 2003 when the study was 
conducted): 
 
 turnover not exceeding £4.8m 
 balance sheet total not exceeding £2.4m 
 up to 50 employees. 
 
The questionnaire used in the survey was developed and piloted through interviews with 
three auditors with small company clients and five directors of small companies. It was 
posted to a named director, together with an accompanying letter and prepaid envelope in 
April 2003. A reminder was sent in May enclosing another copy of the questionnaire and 
prepaid envelope, to increase the response rate (Kervin (1992) and this identified some 
companies that had ceased trading, moved away or where the owner was absent/unable to 
participate. This reduced the list to 2,633 companies from which 790 usable replies were 
received by the end of May, giving a response rate of 30%. 
 
There is no sampling frame that categorises companies according to the size criteria in 
Companies Act 1985. Using the category 0 – 49 employees as a proxy, government statistics 
show that the population of small companies at the start of 2003 was 873,320 (SBS, 2003, 
Table 2). Therefore, a sample of 790 is sufficient to represent that population, as it greatly 
exceeds the minimum acceptable size of 384 suggested by Krejcie and Morgan (1970, p. 
608). Tests for non-response bias found that non-respondents were likely to have been 
smaller in terms of number of employees. This indicates that the sample contained fewer 
companies with no employees or very few employees compared with the population. 
                                                 
8
 The DTI is the government department responsible for company law. 
9
 FAME contains up to 10 years’ information on British companies registered at Companies House (one month 
after the accounts are filed), including more than 2.3m private companies of all sizes. 
10
 Companies filing abbreviated accounts do not disclose all three figures and, therefore, were not represented in 
the sample. 
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However, in terms of turnover and balance sheet total, the results showed that the sample was 
representative of the body of companies from which it was drawn. 
 
4.3 The sample companies 
 
In 94% of cases the questionnaire was answered by the principal director, finance director or 
company secretary. The position and the educational profiles of the respondents suggested 
they would have both tacit and formal knowledge with which to answer the questions and 
weigh up the costs and benefits of the audit when making the audit decision. 
 
As in the wider population, the majority of the sample was at the smaller end of scale in 
terms of size: 80% had a turnover not exceeding £1m, 89% had a balance sheet total not 
exceeding £1.4m, and 78% had less than 10 employees The vast majority (90%) had between 
one and four shareholders and in 74% of companies all shareholders had access to internal 
financial information, from which it can be deduced that these were owner-managed. In 68% 
of cases, the company was wholly family-owned. 
 
4.4 Variables in the analysis 
 
Table 4 describes the variables in the analysis and Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for 
the variables where appropriate.
11
 
 
Table 4 
Description of variables 
 
Variable Description Expected 
sign 
Hypothesis 
tested 
VOLAUDIT Whether company would have a voluntary audit 
(1 = yes, 0 = otherwise) 
Dependent variable 
TOVER Size of company as measured by turnover (£m) Positive H1 
CHECK Extent of agreement that the audit provides a check on 
accounting records and systems (1 = disagree, 5 = agree) 
Positive H2 
QUALITY Extent of agreement that the audit improves the quality of the 
financial information (1 = disagree, 5 = agree) 
Positive H3 
CREDIBLY Extent of agreement that the audit improves the credibility of the 
financial information (1 = disagree, 5 = agree) 
Positive H4 
EDUCATN Whether director has a degree, professional/vocational 
qualification or has studied or trained in business/ management 
subjects (1 = yes, 0 = otherwise) 
Positive H5 
FAMILY Whether company is wholly family-owned 
(1 = yes, 0 = otherwise) 
Negative H6 
EXOWNERS Whether company has shareholders without access to internal 
financial information (1 = yes, 0 = otherwise) 
Positive H7 
BANK Whether statutory accounts are given to the bank and other 
providers of finance (1 = yes, 0 = otherwise) 
Positive H8 
CREDITSC Extent of agreement that the audit has a positive effect on the 
company’s credit rating score (1 = disagree, 5 = agree) 
Positive H9 
 
 
                                                 
11
 Strictly speaking, the mean cannot be calculated for ordinal data, since the ranks represent nominal categories. 
It is given here as an indication of central tendency. The multivariate statistics were based on ranked data. 
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Table 5 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Measurement scale N Minimum Maximum Mean SD 
VOLAUDIT Nominal 772 0 1 N/A N/A 
TOVER Ratio 790 0.000054 4.738271 0.691071 1.119449 
CHECK Ordinal 697 1 5 4.05 1.19 
QUALITY Ordinal 687 1 5 3.35 1.38 
CREDIBLY Ordinal 688 1 5 3.95 1.18 
EDUCATN Nominal 790 0 1 N/A N/A 
FAMILY Nominal 785 0 1 N/A N/A 
EXOWNERS Nominal 722 0 1 N/A N/A 
BANK Nominal 790 0 1 N/A N/A 
CREDITSC Ordinal 681 1 5 3.55 1.29 
 
Apart from size data, the questionnaire survey was the source of all data analysed (non-
responses were excluded). 
 
 Data for the size variable (TOVER) were obtained from the 2002 financial statements on 
FAME and converted from £k to £m to aid the interpretation of the results.  
 CHECK, QUALITY, CREDIBLY and EDUCATN represent management factors 
(questions 15a, 15c, 15d and 23). EDUCATN is a dummy variable, which is a proxy for 
the director’s financial sophistication and knowledge of the relative costs and benefits of 
the audit. FAMILY, EXOWNERS and BANK are dummy variables (questions 1, 3 and 
18) and together with CREDITSC (question 15h) represent the agency factors. 
  
4.5 Multicollinearity 
 
The data was examined for collinearity by examining a correlation matrix of the ordinal and 
ratio variables.
12
 Table 6 shows that none of the correlation coefficients indicate high levels 
of correlation (≥ 0.9), which would make it hard to identify the predictive power of individual 
variables and increase the probability that a good predictor of an outcome will be found non-
significant (Kervin, 1992). 
 
Table 6 
Correlation matrix of ratio and ordinal independent variables 
 
  TOVER CHECK QUALITY CREDIBLY CREDITSC 
TOVER 1.000     
CHECK 0.100* 1.000    
QUALITY 0.105* 0.626* 1.000   
CREDIBLY 0.165* 0.621* 0.661* 1.000  
CREDITSC 0.192* 0.504* 0.532* 0.554* 1.000 
 
N = 790 (cases excluded pairwise with minimum N = 671) 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
                                                 
12
 EDUCATN, FAMILY, EXOWNERS and BANK are not suitable for this procedure as they are measured on a 
nominal scale. 
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5. Results 
 
5.1 Univariate analysis 
 
The survey found that 57% of respondents supported the UK government’s proposal to raise 
the audit exemption threshold to £4.8m. Further analysis shows that among companies that 
were likely to be eligible for the first time if thresholds were raised, 79% predicted they 
would have a voluntary audit. Looking at the sample as whole, 56% intended to take up the 
option to forgo the audit and 42% would have a voluntary audit if they were exempt
13
 and 
these are the two groups in the dependent variable VOLAUDIT. 
 
There are some reservations about basing an analysis on predicted behaviour, but in this case 
it is justified as the forecasts are almost identical to the decision they made in their 2002 
accounts. Using a maximum turnover of £1m as a proxy for eligibility for exemption (the 
threshold in 2002), it was found that 58% of the 633 companies in this category had taken up 
exemption and 42% had not. 
 
The main reason given for not having their accounts audited in 2002 was lower accountancy 
fees, but few directors were able to provide details of the specific amount saved. The mode 
for the 43 that reported specific savings was £1,000, which would appear to be valid as it 
matches the mode of the audit fees disclosed in the companies’ 2002 accounts. These fees 
ranged from £114 to £19,000, but it is likely that these figures are estimates, as it was 
apparent from the preliminary interviews with auditors that there is considerable overlap in 
work involved in preparing the year-end figures, identifying source documents and checking 
control systems, which are part of the audit. 
 
In 30% of companies the shareholders had requested an audit in 2002 and in 27% it was the 
bank or other provider of finance requesting the accounts were audited. A large proportion of 
companies (44%) had external funding in addition to share capital and retained profit. The 
most widely used source of external finance was the bank (used by 69% of companies) and 
51% of companies give a copy of their statutory accounts to the bank or other lender. 
 
5.2 Preliminary tests 
 
Table 7 shows that the results of the Mann-Whitney tests conducted to establish the 
independence of the two groups in the dependent variable VOLAUDIT and the independent 
variables measured on a non-parametric ratio scale (TOVER) or ordinal scale (CHECK, 
QUALITY, CREDIBLY, CREDITSC) were significant (p < 0.01). 
 
                                                 
13
 2% did not respond. 
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Table 7 
Mann-Whitney tests on non-parametric variables 
 
 
Variable VOLAUDIT Mann-Whitney U Z p 
 (Number of companies)    
 No Yes Total    
TOVER 438 334 772 40203.50 -10.731 0.000 
CHECK 362 320 682 37629.00   -8.519 0.000 
QUALITY 356 316 672 32083.00   -9.864 0.000 
CREDIBLY 358 315 673 35323.00   -8.851 0.000 
CREDITSC 355 312 667 33910.00   -8.928 0.000 
 
Chi-square tests were used to measure the association between the two groups in the 
dependent variable (VOLAUDIT) and each independent variable measured on a dichotomous 
nominal scale (FAMILY, EXOWNERS, BANK, EDUCATN). Table 8 provides evidence of 
a significant positive association for FAMILY, EXOWNERS and BANK (p < 0.01). 
However, the result for EDUCATN is not significant (p > 0.05), which provides evidence to 
reject H5. 
 
Table 8 
Chi-square tests on nominal independent variables 
 
Variable Chi-square df p 
EDUCATN   0.888 1 0.346 
FAMILY 33.103 1 0.000 
EXOWNERS 17.406 1 0.000 
BANK 49.468 1 0.000 
 
N = 772 (cases excluded pairwise with minimum N = 706) 
 
5.3 Sufficiency of turnover 
 
The logistic regression models shown in Table 9 extend previous studies by examining the 
sufficiency of turnover as the sole predictor of the demand for voluntary audit in small 
companies, as a surrogate for agency factors and as a surrogate for management factors. 
 
 Panel A presents the analysis where the size variable, TOVER, is regressed alone against 
VOLAUDIT. The result is significant (p  0.05) and the note beneath the table shows that 
the pseudo R
2
 indicates that this model explains 18% of the variance in the dependent 
variable.  
 Panel B present the second analysis where the management variables are entered together 
with TOVER and regressed against VOLAUDIT. In this case, all the results are 
significant except for CREDIBLY, which provides evidence to reject H4. The pseudo R
2
 
indicates that this model explains 34% of the variance in the dependent variable, thus 
demonstrating that the inclusion of the management variables improves the goodness of 
fit. 
 Panel C presents the third analysis where the agency variables entered together with 
TOVER and regressed against VOLAUDIT. All the results are significant and the 
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regression coefficient (B) for FAMILY shows the expected negative relationship with the 
dependent variable. However, the pseudo R
2
 shows this model explains only 31% of the 
variance in the dependent variable. 
 
Table 9 
Logistic regression model of demand for a voluntary audit: Sufficiency of turnover 
 
Variable B SE Wald df p Exp(B) 
Panel A Size factors       
TOVER       0.834 0.097 73.909 1 0.000 2.302 
Constant -0.790 0.092 74.183 1 0.000 0.454 
Panel B Size and management factors       
TOVER       0.750 0.106 50.271 1 0.000 2.118 
CHECK 0.284 0.110 6.674 1 0.010 1.328 
QUALITY 0.404 0.093 18.774 1 0.000 1.497 
CREDIBLY 0.190 0.114 2.777 1 0.096 1.209 
Constant -3.911 0.440 78.924 1 0.000 0.020 
Panel C Size and agency factors       
TOVER 0.505 0.109 21.691 1 0.000 1.658 
FAMILY -0.687 0.198 12.000 1 0.001 0.503 
EXOWNERS   0.702 0.252 7.752 1 0.005 2.018 
BANK   0.434 0.203 4.574 1 0.032 1.543 
CREDITSC 0.559 0.080 48.299 1 0.000 1.749 
Constant -2.378 0.353 45.501 1 0.000 0.093 
 
Model summaries 
Panel A: N = 772; Chi-square 112.648; df 1; p < 0.01; -2 Log likelihood 943.518; Nagelkerke R
2
 0.182 
Panel B: N = 663; Chi-square 192.640; df 4; p < 0.01; -2 Log likelihood 724.178; Nagelkerke R
2
 0.337 
Panel C: N = 611; Chi-square 159.831; df 5, p < 0.01; -2 Log likelihood 685.621; Nagelkerke R
2
 0.307 
 
5.4 Size, management and agency factors 
 
It is clear for the preceding analysis that size, management and agency factors contribute to 
the explanation of the audit decision in small companies. Therefore, a final regression was 
run in which turnover and the management and agency variables that gave significant results 
in Table 9 were entered simultaneously in the model. 
 
The results in Table 10 shows the regression coefficient (B) for FAMILY has the expected 
negative sign and the results are all significant, providing evidence to accept H1 to H3 and 
H6 to H9. The higher values of the Wald statistics and lower probability statistics for 
TOVER, QUALITY and FAMILY compared to the other variables suggest these are the most 
influential factors. Examining the goodness of fit, the pseudo R
2
 indicates that this model 
explains 39% of the variance in the dependent variable, VOLAUDIT, which is an 
improvement over the three models presented in Table 9. 
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Table 10 
Logistic regression model of demand for a voluntary audit: Size, management and 
agency factors 
 
Variable B SE Wald df p Exp(B) 
TOVER 0.561 0.116 23.428 1 0.000 1.753 
CHECK 0.295 0.117 6.375 1 0.012 1.343 
QUALITY 0.442 0.096 21.320 1 0.000 1.557 
FAMILY -0.778 0.211 13.667 1 0.000 0.459 
EXOWNERS 0.644 0.265 5.926 1 0.015 1.904 
BANK   0.449 0.215 4.357 1 0.037 1.567 
CREDITSC 0.257 0.094 7.548 1 0.006 1.293 
Constant -4.003 0.513 60.798 1 0.000 0.018 
 
Model summary 
N = 602; Chi-square 206.889; df 7; p < 0.00; -2 Log likelihood 625.959; Nagelkerke R
2
 0.388 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
In the period since 1994 when the EU 4
th
 Company Law Directive introduced an option 
allowing national jurisdictions to exempt small companies from the statutory audit, Europe 
has moved a long way towards achieving harmonization. A total of 92% of the 25 countries 
that comprise the EU offer audit exemption to small companies. At the beginning of 2006, 
80% were using country-specific size criteria and the remaining 12% had adopted the EU 
maxima. The UK is one of the countries now using the EU maxima, and this was achieved by 
raising the thresholds in three stages over the period 1994 to 2003. 
 
The case of the UK has been further examined by studying the motivation of the directors to 
voluntarily demand audit assurance. The study is based on data collected from the principal 
directors of a representative sample of 790 companies not exceeding £4.8m turnover, £2.4m 
balance sheet total and 50 employees (Collis, 2003). These were the EU maxima for audit 
exemption at the time of the study in 2003, which it had been proposed the UK would adopt. 
 
It is clear that the directors were divided in their views on whether the cost of an audit 
outweighs the benefits or vice versa. A significant proportion (42%) of directors predicted 
they would have a voluntary audit of the accounts if the company were eligible. The validity 
of their future intentions is strengthened by the fact that the proportion of companies already 
having a voluntary audit was also 42% (using the UK turnover threshold in force at the time 
as a proxy for eligibility). 
 
A general interpretation of the results of logistic regression study is that directors who are 
willing to bear the cost of the audit do so because of their beliefs about the net benefits to the 
company and the role the audited accounts play in reducing the cost of capital and supporting 
agency relationships where there is information asymmetry. The results demonstrate that 
turnover is not sufficient alone as a surrogate for the relative costs and benefits of 
independent audit in small companies in the UK. It addition, it was found that turnover plus 
the management factors or turnover plus the agency factors were inferior as explanatory 
models to one that included turnover plus management factors plus agency factors. This 
indicates that size contributes something over and above two specific management factors 
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and four agency factors; an intuitive explanation is that the size variable represents audit cost 
relative to the company’s turnover. 
 
The specific results show that the likelihood of the directors choosing a voluntary audit is 
positively correlated with: 
 
 Size as measured by turnover 
 Management view that 
- Audit provides a check on accounting records and systems 
- Audit improves the quality of the financial information  
 Agency relationships where: 
- The company has non-family shareholders (ie it is not wholly family-owned) 
- The company has external shareholders not involved in day-to-day management 
- The company gives the annual financial statements to the bank and other lenders 
- Management holds the view that audit improves the company’s credit rating score 
 
In the UK, raising the thresholds to meet EU harmonisation objectives has meant that the 
enlarged category of small companies contains two subgroups with differing needs. 
Deregulation means directors are free to choose and in a significant proportion of cases it 
would appear that the benefit of an audit outweighs the costs. This will be reassuring news to 
the accountancy profession, particularly small accountants who rely on fee income from 
auditing the accounts of small companies. It will also be of interest to banks, lenders and 
other creditors who rely on the audited financial statements for assessing and monitoring risk. 
However, lenders and creditors have the economic power to ensure that their needs are met 
and this UK study shows it is important that regulators in other EU member states protect the 
needs of minority shareholders requiring the assurance of an independent audit.
14
 
 
 
                                                 
14
 The survey instrument used in the UK by Collis (2003) has been successfully translated and used in Denmark 
and contributed to data gathering prior to the introduction of audit exemption in that country in 2006. 
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Appendix 
Extract of questionnaire showing variables analysed 
 
 
1. Is the company a family-owned business? (Tick one box only) 
Wholly family-owned   
Partly family-owned   
None of the shareholders are related   
 
3. How many shareholders (owners) does the company have? 
(a) Total number of shareholders   
     Breakdown:   
(b) Number of shareholders with access to internal financial information   
(c) Number of shareholders without access to internal financial information   
 
11. If the statutory accounts were not audited last year but were audited previously, have overall 
accountancy costs decreased? 
No   
Yes, by approximately                                                                                                     £         
 
13. Do you think the turnover threshold for exemption from the statutory audit should be increased from 
£1m to £4.8m? 
(Tick one box only) 
Yes, increase to £4.8m   
No, stay at £1m   
Other                                                                                                                             £m         
 
14. Would you have the accounts audited even if the company were not legally required to do so? 
(Tick one box only) 
Yes, the accounts are already audited voluntarily   
Yes, the accounts would be audited voluntarily   
No   
 
Please give reasons for either answer 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
……………….……………………………………………………………………………………………... 
 
15. What are your views on the following statements regarding the audit? 
(Circle the number closest to your view) 
 Agree                                           Disagree 
(a) Provides a check on accounting records and systems 5 4 3 2 1 
(b) Helps protect against fraud 5 4 3 2 1 
(c) Improves the quality of the financial information 5 4 3 2 1 
(d) Improves the credibility of the financial information 5 4 3 2 1 
(e) Provides assurance to shareholders 5 4 3 2 1 
(f) Provides assurance to the bank and other lenders 5 4 3 2 1 
(g) Provides assurance to suppliers and trade creditors 5 4 3 2 1 
(h) Has a positive effect on company’s credit rating score 5 4 3 2 1 
Other (please state) 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
……………….……………………………………………………………………………………………... 
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18. Apart from Companies House, who normally receives a copy of the company’s statutory accounts? 
(Tick as many boxes as apply) 
(a) Shareholders   
(b) Bank and other providers of finance   
(c) Directors/managers who are not shareholders   
(d) Employees who are not shareholders   
(e) Major suppliers and trade creditors   
(f) Major customers   
(g) Inland Revenue   
Other (please state)   
 
........................................................................................................................................... 
  
 
19. If the accounts were audited last year, is it because any of the following users requested it? 
(Tick as many boxes as apply) 
(a) Shareholders   
(b) Bank and other providers of finance   
(c) Major suppliers and trade creditors   
(d) Major customers   
(e) Inland Revenue   
Other (please state)   
 
........................................................................................................................................... 
  
 
20. Apart from capital invested by the shareholders and retained profit, is the company currently 
financed by any of the following? 
(Tick as many boxes as apply) 
(a) Personal loans from family or friends.   
(b) Bank finance   
(c) Business angel capital   
(d) Venture capital   
(e) Leasing   
(f) Hire purchase   
(g) Factoring   
Other (please state)   
 
........................................................................................................................................... 
  
 
22. What is your position in the company? 
(Tick one box only) 
The sole director   
The principal director (eg managing director or chief executive)   
The finance director    
Other (please state)   
 
........................................................................................................................................... 
  
 
23. Do you have any of the following qualifications/training? 
(Tick as many boxes as apply) 
(a) Undergraduate or postgraduate degree   
(b) Professional/vocational qualification   
(c) Study/training in business or management subjects   
 
